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Abstract 
Equity options are known to be notoriously difficult to price accurately, and even with the development of 
established mathematical models there are many assumptions that must be made about the underlying 
processes driving market movements. As such, the theoretical prices outputted by these models are often 
slightly different from the realized or actual market price. The choice of model traders use can create many 
different valuations on the same asset, which may lead to a form of systematic micro-movement or noise. 
The analysis in this paper demonstrates that approximately 1.7%-4.5% of market volume for options written 
on the SPY ETF within the last two years could potentially be due to systematic noise. 
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Introduction 
The first known usage of an option dates back several thousand years ago to the ancient Greek philosopher 
Thales of Miletus, as Aristotle describes in Politics. Predicting that the coming season would bear a very 
successful olive harvest, Thales, being merely a poor philosopher, acquired the right to use the olive presses 
that turned olives into oil for a small deposit. When the season came and Thales’ prediction about the 
weather turned out to be correct, he was able to make enormous profits for a very small investment. This 
contract that Thales made with the owners of the olive presses is no different from the many modern 
financial contracts we use today, collectively known as derivatives. 
The focus of this paper is on a special type of financial derivative known as an option. An option is a 
contract that gives the contract-holder the right (but not the obligation) to buy or sell an asset, within a 
specified period of time, at a specified price. To clarify some of the terminology, this specified price is 
called the option’s Strike Price, and the last day that the contract may be exercised is called the Maturity 
Date.  
Further, there are two main classes of options. European options are ones that can only be exercised on a 
specific date (i.e. March 25, 2019), while American options may be exercised at any point up to the maturity 
date. In recent years, there has been the rise of more complex derivatives such as Asian options, compound 
options (options written on an option), and others with an embedded equity or debt security—which are 
even more difficult to value accurately and are outside the scope of this paper. In practice, nearly all public 
exchange-traded stock options in the world are of the American form1.  
From the anecdote above, it’s clear that options can have very lucrative payoffs while limiting downside 
risk. However, an important question is on the actual valuation of these options due to their complexity (i.e. 
how much should Thales actually pay the olive press owners?). In the early 1970s, a major breakthrough 
in pricing equity options was achieved by mathematicians known as the Black-Scholes model. Since then, 
the Black-Scholes model has been extended on heavily, with many of its assumptions challenged and 
relaxed, leading to a number of other models such as analytical approximations, lattice tree methods, or 
statistical simulations. 
However, as with any theoretical model, each comes with their own set of assumptions and computational 
methods which makes the pricing of an option in practice slightly different depending on which model one 
uses. As these valuations may form a key factor in trading strategies and decisions, the choice of model and 
their respective mispricings may be creating a form of systematic micro-movement in the equity options 
market.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
1Note that the terms European and American do not have anything to do with the continents. The labels were coined in a 1965 
article by Nobel Laureate Paul Samuelson as he was supposedly discouraged from researching options due to their complexity by 
his European colleagues, and so proceeded to name the simple options ‘European’. 
Overview of Derivative Pricing Models 
Black-Scholes-Merton Options Model 
In 1973, mathematicians Fischer Black, Myron Scholes, and Robert Merton developed a stochastic 
differential equation that modelled the fair price of an option over time, winning the Nobel prize for 
economics in 1997. As one of the earliest formal mathematical models for the valuation of options, this 
breakthrough has had immense impact on how traders price these assets or hedge their portfolios even today. 
This section will briefly explain the main ideas behind the Black-Scholes Model, as well as cover its key 
assumptions and limitations1. 
Let 
𝜇𝜇 = 𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴 𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒 𝑟𝑟𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝐴𝐴𝑟𝑟𝐴𝐴 𝑜𝑜𝐴𝐴 𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑟𝑟𝐴𝐴𝑢𝑢𝑢𝑢𝐴𝐴𝑢𝑢 𝑠𝑠𝑒𝑒𝑜𝑜𝑒𝑒𝑠𝑠 
𝜎𝜎 = 𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴 𝑣𝑣𝑜𝑜𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝑒𝑒𝑢𝑢𝐴𝐴𝑢𝑢𝑒𝑒𝑢𝑢 𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜 𝑠𝑠𝑒𝑒𝑜𝑜𝑒𝑒𝑠𝑠 
First, suppose that changes in stock prices are approximately normally distributed in short periods of time. 
∆𝑆𝑆
𝑆𝑆
 ~ 𝑁𝑁(𝜇𝜇∆𝑒𝑒,𝜎𝜎2∆𝑒𝑒) 
where S is the stock price at time t and N(x,y) is a normal distribution with mean x, variance y 
Assume the stochastic process for underlying price movements follow geometric Brownian motion2. 
𝑒𝑒𝑆𝑆 =  𝜇𝜇𝑆𝑆 𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒 +  𝜎𝜎𝑆𝑆 𝑒𝑒𝑑𝑑 
Note that μ and σ are constant, so it can be shown that (with an application of Itô’s lemma): ln 𝑆𝑆𝑇𝑇  ~ 𝑁𝑁[ln 𝑆𝑆0 + �𝜇𝜇 −  𝜎𝜎22 �𝑇𝑇,𝜎𝜎2𝑇𝑇] 
Thus, it is implied that the stock’s prices are approximately log-normally distributed, at least for very short 
periods of time.  
Now suppose that f is the price of a financial derivative (any asset that has its value derived from the 
underlying stock price). Since f is a function of S and t, by Itô’s lemma: 
𝑒𝑒𝑜𝑜 = �𝜕𝜕𝑜𝑜
𝜕𝜕𝑆𝑆
𝜇𝜇𝑆𝑆 𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒 + 𝜕𝜕𝑜𝑜
𝜕𝜕𝑒𝑒
+ 𝜕𝜕2𝑜𝑜
𝜕𝜕𝑆𝑆2
 𝜎𝜎2𝑆𝑆22 �𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒 + (𝜕𝜕𝑜𝑜𝜕𝜕𝑆𝑆 𝜎𝜎𝑆𝑆) 𝑒𝑒𝑑𝑑 
By constructing a portfolio that shorts one derivative (-1 f) and long ∂f / ∂S shares of the underlying stock: 
𝜋𝜋 =  −𝑜𝑜 +  𝜕𝜕𝑜𝑜
𝜕𝜕𝑆𝑆
𝑆𝑆 
  where π is defined as the portfolio’s value 
 
1 For a full derivation, see the authors’ original work “The Pricing of Options and Corporate Liabilities.” or John C. Hull’s 
comprehensive text “Options, Futures, and Other Derivatives” 
2 This representation is widely used for modelling stock price behavior, however its actual applicability is debated and so serves as 
one of the main assumptions behind the Black-Scholes Model 
The change of this portfolio over small periods of time is then: 
𝑒𝑒𝜋𝜋 =  −𝑒𝑒𝑜𝑜 +  𝜕𝜕𝑜𝑜
𝜕𝜕𝑆𝑆
𝑒𝑒𝑆𝑆 
We have already defined df and dS, and so substituting them into above gives us: 
𝑒𝑒𝜋𝜋 = �−𝜕𝜕𝑜𝑜
𝜕𝜕𝑒𝑒
−
𝜕𝜕2𝑜𝑜
𝜕𝜕𝑆𝑆2
 𝜎𝜎2𝑆𝑆22 �𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒 
It is important to note that the Wiener process component dz is cancelled out, which suggests that this 
portfolio is riskless during small periods of time dt. 
𝑒𝑒𝜋𝜋 = 𝑟𝑟𝜋𝜋 𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒 
�−
𝜕𝜕𝑜𝑜
𝜕𝜕𝑒𝑒
−
𝜕𝜕2𝑜𝑜
𝜕𝜕𝑆𝑆2
 𝜎𝜎2𝑆𝑆22 �𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒 = 𝑟𝑟 �−𝑜𝑜 +  𝜕𝜕𝑜𝑜𝜕𝜕𝑆𝑆 𝑆𝑆� 𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒 
By rearranging terms, 
𝜕𝜕𝑜𝑜
𝜕𝜕𝑒𝑒
+ 𝜕𝜕𝑜𝑜
𝜕𝜕𝑆𝑆
𝑟𝑟𝑆𝑆 + 𝜕𝜕2𝑜𝑜
𝜕𝜕𝑆𝑆2
 𝜎𝜎2𝑆𝑆22 = 𝑟𝑟𝑜𝑜 
Which is the full Black-Scholes-Merton differential equation that models the financial derivative’s price 
with respect to time and the underlying stock price. Note that this has infinitely many solutions 
corresponding to any asset that derives its value from S. To solve for a specific derivative, we can define f 
with a boundary condition. In the case of a European call option, if S drops below the strike price K, 
exercising the option would result in a loss so it makes more sense to simply let it expire worthless1.  
𝑜𝑜 = max(𝑆𝑆 − 𝐾𝐾, 0)  𝐴𝐴𝑒𝑒 𝑒𝑒ℎ𝑒𝑒 𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑟𝑟𝑒𝑒𝑢𝑢𝑠𝑠𝑒𝑒 𝑒𝑒𝐴𝐴𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒  𝑇𝑇 
In addition, it is important to note that the term µ drops out of the BS differential equation. Since the term 
represents annual expected returns, it is affected by the individual risk preferences of investors which makes 
actually solving the differential equation impossible. But since the BS model is independent of risk 
preferences, we can impose a risk-neutral assumption (i.e. µ = r).  
Thus, solutions to the differential equation for European call and put options on non-dividend stocks: 
𝑒𝑒𝑡𝑡 =  𝑆𝑆𝑡𝑡  𝜙𝜙(𝑒𝑒1) − 𝐾𝐾𝑒𝑒−𝑟𝑟(𝑇𝑇−𝑡𝑡)𝜙𝜙(𝑒𝑒2) 
𝑒𝑒𝑡𝑡 =  𝐾𝐾𝑒𝑒−𝑟𝑟(𝑇𝑇−𝑡𝑡)𝜙𝜙(−𝑒𝑒2) −  𝑆𝑆𝑡𝑡  𝜙𝜙(−𝑒𝑒1) 
Where 𝑒𝑒1 =  ln�𝑆𝑆𝑡𝑡𝐾𝐾�+�𝑟𝑟+ 𝜎𝜎22 �(𝑇𝑇−𝑡𝑡)𝜎𝜎√𝑇𝑇−𝑡𝑡  
𝑒𝑒2 =  𝑒𝑒1 −  𝜎𝜎√𝑇𝑇 − 𝑒𝑒 
𝜙𝜙(𝑒𝑒) =  1
√2𝜋𝜋
∫ 𝑒𝑒−
−𝑥𝑥2
2
𝑥𝑥
−∞  or the CDF for a standard normal distribution 
1 As mentioned in the introduction, European call options can only be exercised at a specific time T, while American options may 
be exercised at any point up to then. It can be shown that while the BSM model can’t directly apply to American options, its 
valuation can be broken down into a theoretical European price plus an early exercise premium. Thus the BSM model can be useful 
even for more complex derivatives by acting as a lower bound in approximations. See Black’s Approximation. 
Model Assumptions 
To recap, the main assumptions used to derive the BSM differential equation: 
• Underlying stock price follows a geometric Brownian motion with known and constant μ and σ 
• Market permits short selling securities, with no transaction costs or taxes on capital gains 
• Prices are continuous and so are transactions, suggesting that securities are perfectly divisible (i.e. 
it is possible to buy 1.0592849… amounts of shares) 
• Risk-free rate is constant and the same across all derivatives with different maturities 
Main assumptions for solutions of the PDE to price European options: 
• Underlying stock does not pay dividends 
• Risk-neutral probability measure (i.e. the stochastic process is a martingale) 
Many of these assumptions of the original BSM model are challenged and can be relaxed. Even the most 
fundamental ones about the underlying price movements are questioned, with studies suggesting that the 
distribution of returns is in fact leptokurtic, skewed, and even prone to discontinuous jumps (see Anderson, 
et al. “The Distribution of Stock Return Volatility”). In practice, the Black-Scholes is still widely used 
despite its limitations given its ease of computation, though practitioners (especially at quantitative hedge 
funds or trading desks) would usually slightly adjust the model. This can range from simply treating the 
volatility and risk-free parameters as non-constant via autoregressive models, to building sophisticated 
stochastic-volatility jump-diffusion models as alternatives to the BS. However the BS model is still 
incredibly important in its role as a benchmark (and potentially valuation bounds) in the market, and it’s 
not unreasonable that a significant number of practitioners still heavily rely on the BS as its simplicity can 
outweigh the slight improvement in accuracy from more complex models. This paper then focuses on two 
relatively simple pricing models, the Black-Scholes and the Barone-Adesi and Whaley (BAW) analytical 
approximation. Thus, while there are certainly other models that are used to price options, these two should 
capture a significant portion of any systematic market movements between them as even the more 
sophisticated models are only marginally more accurate in practice.  
Barone-Adesi and Whaley Model 
Published in 1987, just 14 years after the Black-Scholes model, researchers Giovanni Barone-Adesi and 
Robert Whaley developed a simple analytical approximation method to price American options (BAW). 
Traditional methods to price American options at the time were extremely computationally inefficient and 
difficult, and as is demonstrated by the BS model, there are no closed-form analytical solutions (one such 
method include working with binomial trees in discrete time, see Cox-Ross-Rubinstein). Another advantage 
is that the BAW model can be extended to price options written on dividend-paying stocks.  
First, the BAW makes the same assumptions as the BS regarding the underlying price movements. 
Supposing that these movements can be modeled by geometric Brownian motion, Whaley claims that the 
partial differential equation can also apply to the early exercise premium of an American option. In other 
words, American options are simply European options with an added component for allowing one to 
exercise early.  
Define the early exercise premium as 
𝜀𝜀(𝑆𝑆,𝑇𝑇) = 𝐶𝐶(𝑆𝑆,𝑇𝑇) − 𝑒𝑒(𝑆𝑆,𝑇𝑇) 
  where C(S,T) is the American option’s value and c(S,T) is the equivalent European option 
Through some simplification, factoring, and re-arranging it can be shown that: 
𝜀𝜀(𝑆𝑆,𝑋𝑋) = 𝑋𝑋( 𝑇𝑇)𝑜𝑜(𝑆𝑆,𝑋𝑋) 
𝜕𝜕2𝑜𝑜
𝜕𝜕𝑆𝑆2
𝑆𝑆2 + 𝜕𝜕𝑜𝑜
𝜕𝜕𝑆𝑆
2𝑏𝑏𝑆𝑆
𝜎𝜎2
− 𝑜𝑜
2𝑟𝑟
𝜎𝜎2𝑋𝑋
−
𝜕𝜕𝑜𝑜
𝜕𝜕𝑋𝑋
(1 − 𝑋𝑋)2𝑟𝑟
𝜎𝜎2
= 0 
Which describes the value of the early exercise premium over time. For very short times to expiration, as 
(T-t) approaches 0, ∂f / ∂X also approaches 0. For very long times to expiration, (T-t) approaches ∞, X 
approaches 1. Thus, as an approximation, the last term is dropped. ~ 𝜕𝜕2𝑜𝑜
𝜕𝜕𝑆𝑆2
𝑆𝑆2 + 𝜕𝜕𝑜𝑜
𝜕𝜕𝑆𝑆
2𝑏𝑏𝑆𝑆
𝜎𝜎2
− 𝑜𝑜
2𝑟𝑟
𝜎𝜎2𝑋𝑋
= 0 
Note that this becomes an ordinary differential equation with f = aSq and parameters a, q. 
𝑒𝑒2𝑜𝑜
𝑒𝑒𝑆𝑆2
𝑆𝑆2 + 𝑒𝑒𝑜𝑜
𝑒𝑒𝑆𝑆
2𝑏𝑏𝑆𝑆
𝜎𝜎2
− 𝑜𝑜
2𝑟𝑟
𝜎𝜎2𝑋𝑋
= 0 
The general solution to the differential equation is 
𝑜𝑜 =  𝐴𝐴1𝑆𝑆𝑞𝑞1 +  𝐴𝐴2𝑆𝑆𝑞𝑞2 
Thus, it can be shown that the price of an American call option is approximately: 
 𝐶𝐶(𝑆𝑆,𝑇𝑇) = 𝑒𝑒(𝑆𝑆,𝑇𝑇) + ( 𝑆𝑆
𝑆𝑆∗
)𝑞𝑞2𝐴𝐴2 when S < S* 
 𝐶𝐶(𝑆𝑆,𝑇𝑇) = 𝑆𝑆 − 𝐾𝐾  when S ≥ S* 
  where 𝐴𝐴2 =  𝑆𝑆∗𝑞𝑞2 (1 − 𝑒𝑒(𝑏𝑏−𝑟𝑟)(𝑇𝑇−𝑡𝑡)𝜙𝜙[𝑒𝑒1(𝑆𝑆∗)]) > 0 
            𝑞𝑞2 =  12 [−�2𝑏𝑏𝜎𝜎2 − 1� +  ��2𝑏𝑏𝜎𝜎2 − 1�2 +  8𝑟𝑟𝑋𝑋𝜎𝜎2] > 0 
b is the cost of carry (b = r for non-dividend stocks, otherwise b = r – d where d is 
dividend yield) 
   S*, S** are critical points that can be determined iteratively1 
Similarly, to derive the price of an American put option: 
𝑃𝑃(𝑆𝑆,𝑇𝑇) = 𝑒𝑒(𝑆𝑆,𝑇𝑇) + ( 𝑆𝑆
𝑆𝑆∗∗
)𝑞𝑞1𝐴𝐴1 when S > S** 
 𝑃𝑃(𝑆𝑆,𝑇𝑇) = 𝐾𝐾 − 𝑆𝑆  when S ≥ S* 
where 𝐴𝐴1 =  −𝑆𝑆∗∗𝑞𝑞2 (1 − 𝑒𝑒(𝑏𝑏−𝑟𝑟)(𝑇𝑇−𝑡𝑡)𝜙𝜙[−𝑒𝑒1(𝑆𝑆∗∗)]) > 0  
            𝑞𝑞1 =  12 [−�2𝑏𝑏𝜎𝜎2 − 1� −  ��2𝑏𝑏𝜎𝜎2 − 1�2 +  8𝑟𝑟𝑋𝑋𝜎𝜎2] < 0 
 
1 The critical points S*, S** can be determined by an algorithm that the authors suggested in their original work, “Efficient Analytic 
Approximation of American Option Values”, 1987. 
The Theory 
As with any financial market, option price movements are going to be primarily driven by expectations of 
the future. Thus, the current market price can be essentially viewed as a collective weighted average of 
future expectations. However, there has been growing dissent among financial economists as to whether 
markets are efficient, the existence of excess risk-adjusted returns, whether prices actually follow a random 
walk, and so on. This has likely contributed to the growing fragmentation of the financial industry in recent 
years, for example a strong believer in market efficiency might take on a more passive, index-based market 
approach while an active manager might try to capitalize on short-term market inefficiencies. Of course, 
few would believe the markets to be entirely efficient nor inefficient, and most people in fact would lie 
somewhere in between.   
The key premise behind this paper is to recognize that there exists at least some degree of market 
inefficiency, no matter how large or small, and to try to isolate the systematic market movements that are 
caused by the existence of different valuations on the same asset. These different valuations, as discussed 
in the previous section, are potentially due to the usage of different pricing models in practice. Thus, it is 
possible that the existence of these different valuations then creates a form of systematic movement which 
is independent of risk preferences or expected returns.   
A Simple Demonstration 
Suppose we have a theoretical market with an asset currently trading for $5.00 at t1. At some time in the 
future t2, assume that a fair valuation is $7.00. In this market, information “trickles down” in the sense that 
prices change gradually, where it initially moves from investors trading private information or unusual 
analytical ability, followed by the public who gradually adjust market prices as access to that information 
or analysis becomes more publicly available1.  
Thus in this very simple theoretical market, the price trend may look something like below. After the change, 
the price stabilizes at $7 under no-arbitrage conditions. 
 
(Figure 1) 
 
1 Otherwise, without this trickle-down effect, markets would be theoretically discontinuous and immediately adjust. Whether this 
simple model is an accurate representation of real financial markets isn’t the point, the purpose is to illustrate the effect that the 
existence of different valuations may have. 
Now suppose that the future price at t2 is unknown, and so must be estimated via a model. Let’s say the 
market consists of two different groups of investors. Based on their fundamental views, experience, or 
preference the first group decides to use Model A to price this asset. The second group prefers Model B 
and thus prices the asset slightly differently due to the different assumptions in the two models. 
 
(Figure 2) 
Because there are now two different valuations of the same asset, the market is unable to settle on any one 
specific price as it did in the previous example. At any given price, the two groups hold different 
fundamental views on the asset’s fair valuation. If the asset’s price is close to the bottom red line, Group B 
may find that it is a fair price however Group A thinks it is undervalued according to their model. This 
would lead to an increase in net long positions, driving the price up. But when the price moves up, Group 
B then thinks it is overvalued and begins shorting the market, driving the price back down and repeating ad 
infinitum – creating systematic up and down movements in the form of noise. In the context of the two 
models discussed earlier, it can be seen that the Black-Scholes price is always lower than the Barone-Adesi 
and Whaley approximation and serves as a lower bound.  
This logic can be extended more generally to any movement in any financial market, as individual investors 
can have different expectations based on their access to information, risk preferences, analytical ability, or 
other qualitative attributes. However, the equity options market is a particularly unique application of this 
logic since there exists standardized ways to price options via widely accepted models, in which case a 
major determinant for these systematic up-and-down movements in the short-run could simply be the result 
of the usage of different models. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
The Empirical Model 
According to the theoretical ideas behind this paper, the existence of different valuations should have a 
positive impact on trading volume, and this will be the main hypothesis that will be tested throughout the 
analysis. 
To begin, recall an earlier claim that price movements are primarily driven by expectations of the future. It 
then follows that trading volume can be thought of as driven by the difference between current price and 
future expectations, such that if expectations of future price is equivalent to current price, there would be 
no need for any market adjustment. 
And so a possible model for volume, weighted by each investor’s individual capital allocation could be: 
𝑉𝑉𝑜𝑜𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝑉𝑉𝑒𝑒𝑡𝑡 = [𝑊𝑊𝑒𝑒𝑢𝑢𝑢𝑢ℎ𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒 𝐷𝐷𝑢𝑢𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑒𝑒𝑟𝑟𝑒𝑒𝐴𝐴𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑠𝑠 𝐵𝐵𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝐵𝐵𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝐴𝐴 𝐹𝐹𝐴𝐴𝑒𝑒𝐴𝐴𝑟𝑟𝑒𝑒 𝐸𝐸𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝐴𝐴𝑒𝑒𝑢𝑢𝑜𝑜𝐴𝐴𝑠𝑠 𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝑒𝑒 𝐶𝐶𝐴𝐴𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑒𝑒𝐴𝐴𝑒𝑒 𝑃𝑃𝑟𝑟𝑢𝑢𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒] +  𝜀𝜀𝑡𝑡   
where 𝜀𝜀𝑡𝑡 is the error term 
The 𝜀𝜀𝑡𝑡 can be interpreted as a measure of market inefficiency, which will be referred to as noise. We can 
then break this term down into systematic and non-systematic components: 
𝜀𝜀𝑡𝑡 = [𝑆𝑆𝑢𝑢𝑠𝑠𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑉𝑉𝐴𝐴𝑒𝑒𝑢𝑢𝑒𝑒 𝑁𝑁𝑜𝑜𝑢𝑢𝑠𝑠𝑒𝑒] + [𝑁𝑁𝑜𝑜𝐴𝐴𝑠𝑠𝑢𝑢𝑠𝑠𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑉𝑉𝐴𝐴𝑒𝑒𝑢𝑢𝑒𝑒 𝑁𝑁𝑜𝑜𝑢𝑢𝑠𝑠𝑒𝑒] 
Where systematic noise, as described earlier, could at least be partially due to the usage of different pricing 
models in practice. Non-systematic noise on the other hand is quite clearly impossible to model. For 
example, if someone decides to log onto his brokerage account and start randomly hitting keys on his 
keyboard. Thus, non-systematic noise can be interpreted both as a measure of general irrationality1 or trades 
that are made without regard to expectations of future price (i.e. as part of a hedging strategy). 
Denote the market option price at time t by Pt and the models’ theoretical price by E[Pt | BS] and E[Pt | 
BAW] such that the pricing errors are: 
�
𝑋𝑋𝐵𝐵𝑆𝑆𝑡𝑡 = 𝐸𝐸[𝑃𝑃𝑡𝑡  | 𝐵𝐵𝑆𝑆] − 𝑃𝑃𝑡𝑡
𝑋𝑋𝐵𝐵𝐵𝐵𝐵𝐵𝑡𝑡 = 𝐸𝐸[𝑃𝑃𝑡𝑡  | 𝐵𝐵𝐴𝐴𝑊𝑊] − 𝑃𝑃𝑡𝑡  
Which gives us [𝑆𝑆𝑢𝑢𝑠𝑠𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑉𝑉𝐴𝐴𝑒𝑒𝑢𝑢𝑒𝑒 𝑁𝑁𝑜𝑜𝑢𝑢𝑠𝑠𝑒𝑒] =  𝑋𝑋𝐵𝐵𝑆𝑆𝑡𝑡 +  𝑋𝑋𝐵𝐵𝐵𝐵𝐵𝐵𝑡𝑡 +  𝑏𝑏𝑡𝑡 
where bt contains other potential sources of systematic noise (ie other pricing models) 
Such that 
𝑉𝑉𝑜𝑜𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝑉𝑉𝑒𝑒𝑡𝑡 = [𝑊𝑊𝑒𝑒𝑢𝑢𝑢𝑢ℎ𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒 𝐷𝐷𝑢𝑢𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜.  𝑢𝑢𝐴𝐴 𝐸𝐸𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝐴𝐴𝑒𝑒𝑢𝑢𝑜𝑜𝐴𝐴𝑠𝑠] + 𝑋𝑋𝐵𝐵𝑆𝑆𝑡𝑡 +  𝑋𝑋𝐵𝐵𝐵𝐵𝐵𝐵𝑡𝑡 +  𝑑𝑑𝑡𝑡   
 
 
 
 
1 Due to the relatively complex nature of options, it isn’t unreasonable to think that there is far less room for irrationality than other 
traded securities as the complexity essentially serves as a barrier of entry into the market.  
Clearly the first term, weighted differences between expectations of the future and current price, is 
unobserved and impossible to model as that’ll require knowledge of every investor’s individual 
expectations, risk preferences, and capital allocation. However, from the underlying theory behind this 
paper, if we assume that price changes are gradual and continuous, it is possible that past volume could 
serve as a proxy for this first term through the momentum effect of stock behavior1.  
The autoregressive portion of the model with k-lags (k to be determined empirically later): 
𝑉𝑉𝑜𝑜𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝑉𝑉𝑒𝑒𝑡𝑡 =  𝜑𝜑0 +  𝜑𝜑1𝑉𝑉𝑜𝑜𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝑉𝑉𝑒𝑒𝑡𝑡−1 + ⋯+ 𝜑𝜑𝑘𝑘𝑉𝑉𝑜𝑜𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝑉𝑉𝑒𝑒𝑡𝑡−𝑘𝑘 +  𝐴𝐴𝑡𝑡   
where at is the white noise component of the time series 
Here the term at can be interpreted as an innovation at time t, referring to some new information at time t 
that affects the time series. Because the hypothesis is that pricing errors may be contributing to systematic 
market movements, these errors may then be considered partial innovations at time t. 
Therefore, the theoretical model that will be tested is: 
𝑉𝑉𝑜𝑜𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝑉𝑉𝑒𝑒𝑡𝑡 =  𝜑𝜑0 +  𝜑𝜑1𝑉𝑉𝑜𝑜𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝑉𝑉𝑒𝑒𝑡𝑡−1 + ⋯+ 𝜑𝜑𝑘𝑘𝑉𝑉𝑜𝑜𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝑉𝑉𝑒𝑒𝑡𝑡−𝑘𝑘 +  𝜑𝜑𝑘𝑘+1𝑋𝑋𝐵𝐵𝑆𝑆𝑡𝑡 +  𝜑𝜑𝑘𝑘+2𝑋𝑋𝐵𝐵𝐵𝐵𝐵𝐵𝑡𝑡 +  𝐴𝐴𝑡𝑡 
where ut is a white noise series2 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
1 Momentum is the idea that price movements may follow a trend over time rather than instantly reflecting new information. This 
phenomenon is increasingly supported by literature and even accepted by Eugene Fama of the Efficient Market Hypothesis as a 
market anomaly. 
2 Note that the term white noise is the time series’ equivalent of an error term, and not to be confused with the paper’s definition 
of financial noise as systematic market movements 
The Methodology 
Description of the Data 
End-of-day (EOD) historical options data written on the SPDR S&P 500 Trust ETF (SPY) over the last two 
years (01/02/2015 – 12/30/2016) was collected from data service IVolatility. As the SPY is one of the most 
actively traded ETFs in the world and also holds one of the deepest options markets, this makes it a good 
candidate for analysis as the underlying theoretical ideas implicitly assume an actively traded and liquid 
market. In addition, the widely-diversified nature of an index-tracking ETF makes it less prone to sudden 
price shocks, such as unexpected news or announcements or legislature that would affect an individual 
company or industry more severely. The relatively smoother movements of the SPY are also more in line 
with the continuous price trend assumptions described earlier. 
Descriptive Statistics of Options written on SPY (EOD) from 01/02/15 - 12/30/16  
Statistic N Mean St. Dev. Min Max  
adjusted.stock.close.price 2,089,590 207.806 8.644 182.860 227.760 
strike 2,089,590 190.159 53.474 7.000 350.000 
ask 2,089,590 22.561 34.050 0.000 219.500 
bid 2,089,590 22.164 33.631 0.000 217.090 
volume 2,089,590 622.227 4,196.244 0 667,769 
open.interest 2,089,590 4,902.684 16,783.390 0 565,321 
 
The data is then filtered for existing trading activity as any analysis on contracts that aren’t traded or don’t 
actually exist is fairly meaningless and will skew the results1. Thus, any interpretation moving forwards 
should take into account that the data was filtered for non-zero volume and open interest which limits the 
dataset to only actively traded options contracts between 2015-2016. 
Descriptive Statistics of Actively Traded SPY Options  
Statistic N Mean St. Dev. Min Max  
adjusted.stock.close.price 705,885 208.023 8.912 182.860 227.760 
strike 705,885 196.642 29.455 8.000 350.000 
ask 705,885 6.787 11.822 0.000 201.290 
bid 705,885 6.622 11.620 0.000 199.710 
volume 705,885 1,495.250 5,940.193 1 500,656 
open.interest 705,885 11,118.550 24,974.550 1 565,321 
 
 
 
 
 
1 Note that at any given time, there can be a large number of possible variations of options contracts with different maturities or 
strikes, but only a few dozen are actually actively traded. Open Interest is a measure of the number of open contracts currently on 
the market, and so the data is filtered for activity by imposing the condition that open interest and volume is non-zero. 
In addition, treasury rates and historical volatility of the underlying index were used as parameters in the 
computation of theoretical prices. 
Average Treasury rates from 2015-2016  
Statistic N Mean St. Dev. Min Max  
X1.mo 501 0.145 0.125 0.000 0.500 
X3.mo 501 0.186 0.154 0.000 0.550 
X6.mo 501 0.314 0.184 0.050 0.660 
X1.yr 501 0.468 0.189 0.160 0.920 
X2.yr 501 0.760 0.160 0.440 1.290 
X3.yr 501 1.014 0.171 0.660 1.610 
X5.yr 501 1.433 0.228 0.940 2.100 
X7.yr 501 1.763 0.259 1.190 2.420 
X10.yr 501 1.988 0.277 1.370 2.600 
X20.yr 501 2.383 0.298 1.690 2.980 
X30.yr 501 2.718 0.275 2.110 3.250 
 
Historical Volatility of Underlying SPY ETF  
Statistic  Mean St. Dev. Min Max  
Volatility  0.132 0.061 0.044 0.380 
 
Computation of Theoretical Prices 
The theoretical prices outputted by the Black-Scholes and Barone-Adesi and Whaley models were 
computed for the filtered dataset using an R script, using a collection of functions within the package 
fOptions. As defined previously, the pricing errors are the difference between the model’s expected price 
and the market’s current price (mid-point between bid and ask).  
Pricing Errors1 ($)  
Statistic N Mean St. Dev. Min Max  
BS.Error 1,458,867 -0.978 2.708 -22.956 24.973 
BAW.Error 1,458,867 -0.786 2.800 -22.402 24.989 
 
As seen from the output, both models tend to under-estimate the option price which is an observed 
phenomenon in literature as implied volatilities tend to be higher than historical volatilities. Some 
researchers point to behavioral economics in which investors tend to demand a risk premium as 
compensation rather than the risk-neutrality that the models assume (see Volatility Smile). 
1 A trailing 21-day historical volatility was used for the computations of the model prices across options with different strikes and 
maturities. While this is consistent with the Black-Scholes assumption of a constant volatility term structure, in practice it may be 
more precise to use historical volatility rates that scale with time to expiration. As a result of this assumption, a handful of 
theoretical prices were excessively large (near infinite) and so a handful of outliers above 25 (9 s.d. away) were dropped.   
The Analysis 
From before, the theoretical model to be tested is: 
𝑉𝑉𝑜𝑜𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝑉𝑉𝑒𝑒𝑡𝑡 =  𝜑𝜑0 +  𝜑𝜑1𝑉𝑉𝑜𝑜𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝑉𝑉𝑒𝑒𝑡𝑡−1 + ⋯+ 𝜑𝜑𝑘𝑘𝑉𝑉𝑜𝑜𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝑉𝑉𝑒𝑒𝑡𝑡−𝑘𝑘 +  𝜑𝜑𝑘𝑘+1𝑋𝑋𝐵𝐵𝑆𝑆𝑡𝑡 +  𝜑𝜑𝑘𝑘+2𝑋𝑋𝐵𝐵𝐵𝐵𝐵𝐵𝑡𝑡 +  𝐴𝐴𝑡𝑡 
where ut is a white noise series 
As this is a k-lagged autoregressive model, a important procedure is to ensure that the time series is 
stationary. Any statistical inference in time series analysis heavily relies on an assumption of weak 
stationarity, which means that the time series’ first two moments, mean and variance, do not vary over time. 
In addition, a further assumption that will be important for prediction is that these two moments are also 
finite.  
 
(Figure 3) 
 
Statistic N Mean St. Dev. Min Max 
 
Volume 486 2,820.531 635.295 1,367.693 5,268.078 
      
(Figure 4) 
From Figure 3, the market volume for SPY options seems to stay around the mean, and the variance is 
roughly constant over time, so the time series appears to be approximately stationary. To formally test this, 
one method is the augmented Dickey-Fuller test to verify the existence of a unit-root. But first, we have to 
determine the k number of lags to use. 
Identifying the Order of the AR Model 
In order to determine an appropriate time lag to use for the autoregressive portion of the model (past 
volume), one approach is to use the partial autocorrelation function (PACF)1.  
First, consider the following AR models of varying orders in succession: 
𝑉𝑉𝑜𝑜𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝑉𝑉𝑒𝑒𝑡𝑡 =  𝜑𝜑0,1 +  𝜑𝜑1,1𝑉𝑉𝑜𝑜𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝑉𝑉𝑒𝑒𝑡𝑡−1 +  𝜖𝜖1,𝑡𝑡 
𝑉𝑉𝑜𝑜𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝑉𝑉𝑒𝑒𝑡𝑡 =  𝜑𝜑0,2 +  𝜑𝜑1,2𝑉𝑉𝑜𝑜𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝑉𝑉𝑒𝑒𝑡𝑡−1 + 𝜑𝜑2,2𝑉𝑉𝑜𝑜𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝑉𝑉𝑒𝑒𝑡𝑡−2 +  𝜖𝜖2,𝑡𝑡 
𝑉𝑉𝑜𝑜𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝑉𝑉𝑒𝑒𝑡𝑡 =  𝜑𝜑0,3 +  𝜑𝜑1,3𝑉𝑉𝑜𝑜𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝑉𝑉𝑒𝑒𝑡𝑡−1 + 𝜑𝜑2,3𝑉𝑉𝑜𝑜𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝑉𝑉𝑒𝑒𝑡𝑡−2 +  𝜑𝜑3,3𝑉𝑉𝑜𝑜𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝑉𝑉𝑒𝑒𝑡𝑡−3 +  𝜖𝜖3,𝑡𝑡 
  … 
𝑉𝑉𝑜𝑜𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝑉𝑉𝑒𝑒𝑡𝑡 =  𝜑𝜑0,𝑗𝑗 +  𝜑𝜑1,𝑗𝑗𝑉𝑉𝑜𝑜𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝑉𝑉𝑒𝑒𝑡𝑡−1 + ⋯+  𝜑𝜑𝑗𝑗,𝑗𝑗𝑉𝑉𝑜𝑜𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝑉𝑉𝑒𝑒𝑡𝑡−𝑗𝑗 +  𝜖𝜖𝑗𝑗,𝑡𝑡 
 
Let 𝜑𝜑�1,1 denote the sample coefficient on the first time-lag, formally called the lag-1 sample PACF. Notice 
that these models are multiple linear regressions and can be estimated by OLS. Thus, similar to the logic 
behind partial F tests, we can find the value of 𝜑𝜑�𝑗𝑗,𝑗𝑗 after which consecutive coefficients are insignificant.  
 
(Figure 5) 
The blue lines mark significance at the 95% level, which suggests that an autoregressive model with order 
22 (i.e. 22 time lags) may be appropriate. Here it should be noted that the sample PACF does decay 
exponentially rather rapidly, which again supports the stationarity claim earlier. 
 
1 Other methods include informational criteria methods such as the Akaike and Schwarz-Bayesian criterion, but they give similar 
results and the PACF may be more intuitive 
Testing for Stationarity 
The augmented Dickey-Fuller (ADF) tests whether a time series has a unit root or equivalently, follows a 
random walk1. This is done by fitting a model of the form: 
∆𝑉𝑉𝑡𝑡 =  𝐴𝐴0 +  𝛽𝛽𝑉𝑉𝑡𝑡−1 + 𝛿𝛿𝑒𝑒 + 𝐴𝐴1∆𝑉𝑉𝑡𝑡−1 + ⋯+ 𝐴𝐴22∆𝑉𝑉𝑡𝑡−22 + 𝐴𝐴𝑡𝑡 
The terms a0 and δt are the model’s constant and drift terms for the random walk. However from Figure 3, 
it appears that the time series seems to vary around the mean with no visible time trend. Thus, we can drop 
the drift term and test the following: 
∆𝑉𝑉𝑡𝑡 =  𝐴𝐴0 + 𝛽𝛽𝑉𝑉𝑡𝑡−1 + 𝐴𝐴1∆𝑉𝑉𝑡𝑡−1 + ⋯+ 𝐴𝐴22∆𝑉𝑉𝑡𝑡−22 + 𝐴𝐴𝑡𝑡 
The null and alternative hypotheses of the ADF t-test are: 
𝐻𝐻0 ∶  𝛽𝛽 = 0 
𝐻𝐻𝐵𝐵 ∶  𝛽𝛽 < 0 
Or in other words, the ADF tests the null hypothesis is that Volume follows a random walk without drift 
with the alternative being stationarity.  
Title: 
Augmented Dickey-Fuller Test 
 
Test Results: 
PARAMETER: 
Lag Order: 22 
STATISTIC: 
Dickey-Fuller: -121.8869 
P VALUE: 
0.01 
 
Thus, the null hypothesis is rejected in support of the alternative hypothesis that Volume is stationary. 
And with the stationarity condition fulfilled, this suggests a linear autoregressive model with order 22 and 
pricing errors as shocks. 
𝑉𝑉𝑡𝑡 =  𝜑𝜑0 +  �𝜑𝜑𝑖𝑖𝑉𝑉𝑡𝑡−𝑖𝑖22
𝑖𝑖=1
+  𝜑𝜑23𝑋𝑋𝐵𝐵𝑆𝑆𝑡𝑡 +  𝜑𝜑24𝑋𝑋𝐵𝐵𝐵𝐵𝐵𝐵𝑡𝑡 +  𝐴𝐴𝑡𝑡 
where t = 23, …, T 
 
 
 
 
1A random walk is a stochastic process that describes the path of a random variable over time. This can range from a simple set of 
random variables in discrete time to special cases like Brownian motion which form the basis of the Black Scholes. In the finance 
context, a random walk implies that stock price changes are independent and move randomly. 
Model Specifications 
It may be more meaningful to observe changes in volume in terms of percentages, which could justify the 
following logarithmic transformation: 
log (𝑉𝑉𝑡𝑡) =  𝜑𝜑0 +  �𝜑𝜑𝑖𝑖log (𝑉𝑉𝑡𝑡−𝑖𝑖)22
𝑖𝑖=1
+  𝜑𝜑23𝑋𝑋𝐵𝐵𝑆𝑆𝑡𝑡 +  𝜑𝜑24𝑋𝑋𝐵𝐵𝐵𝐵𝐵𝐵𝑡𝑡 +  𝐴𝐴𝑡𝑡 
In addition, it should be noted that the relationship between volume and pricing errors appears non-linear, 
which may further support the transformation by reducing the effect of large deviances and improving the 
results of the model.  
The full regression output is on the following page. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
The Results 
Transformed Autoregressive-22 Model (Lags are logged)  
 Effect on Market Volume (%) 
 (1) (2) (3)  
Black-Scholes Errors 0.027***  0.051*** 
 (0.001)  (0.004)     
Barone-Whaley 
Errors 
 0.024*** -0.024*** 
  (0.001) (0.004)     
Lag 1 0.098*** 0.098*** 0.098*** 
 (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)     
Lag 2 0.272*** 0.272*** 0.272*** 
 (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)     
Lag 3 0.082*** 0.082*** 0.082*** 
 (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)     
Lag 4 0.142*** 0.143*** 0.142*** 
 (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)     
Lag 5 0.024*** 0.024*** 0.024*** 
 (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)     
Lag 6 0.074*** 0.074*** 0.074*** 
 (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)     
Lag 7 0.013*** 0.013*** 0.013*** 
 (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)     
Lag 8 0.053*** 0.053*** 0.053*** 
 (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)     
Lag 9 0.012*** 0.012*** 0.012*** 
 (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)     
Lag 10 0.019*** 0.018*** 0.019*** 
 (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)     
Lag 11 0.006*** 0.006*** 0.006*** 
 (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)     
Lag 12 0.023*** 0.023*** 0.023*** 
 (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)     
Lag 13 -0.001 -0.001 -0.001 
 (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)     
Lag 14 0.001 0.001 0.001 
 (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)     
Lag 15 0.003** 0.003** 0.003** 
 (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)     
Lag 16 0.014*** 0.014*** 0.014*** 
 (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)     
Lag 17 0.004*** 0.004*** 0.004*** 
 (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)     
Lag 18 -0.005*** -0.005*** -0.005*** 
 (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)     
Lag 19 0.005*** 0.005*** 0.005*** 
 (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)     
Lag 20 0.006*** 0.006*** 0.006*** 
 (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)     
Lag 21 0.002 0.002 0.002 
 (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)     
Lag 22 -0.014*** -0.014*** -0.014*** 
 (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)     
Constant 0.752*** 0.742*** 0.753*** 
 (0.008) (0.007) (0.008)     
Observations 705,863 705,863 705,863 
R2 0.370 0.369 0.370 
Adjusted R2 0.369 0.369 0.370 
Residual Std. Error 2.092 (df = 705839) 2.092 (df = 705839) 2.092 (df = 705838) 
F Statistic 17,985.710
*** (df = 23; 
705839) 
17,976.170*** (df = 23; 
705839) 
17,239.010*** (df = 24; 
705838)  
Notes: ***Significant at the 1 percent level. 
 **Significant at the 5 percent level. 
 *Significant at the 10 percent level. 
 
 
Note: Some restraint should be taken when interpreting the individual coefficients of model (3), and not as 
a set. The correlation between BS Errors and BAW Errors is very high at approximately 96%, suggesting 
an issue of multicollinearity and extreme sensitivity in the estimators, though reasonably low VIFs show 
that this may not be a particularly big issue. 
Generalized Variance-Inflation Factors 
BS.Errors: 13.9534 
BAW.Errors: 13.8788 
All Lags: < 2  
 
 
 
 
Conclusion 
The results of the regression model suggest that the existence of pricing errors tends to have a positive and 
significant effect on market volume, after controlling for price trends and market momentum. Errors from 
the Black-Scholes model tend to exhibit a stronger effect on market volume than the Barone-Whaley and 
Adesi approximation. It is possible then that the Black-Scholes model may be more widely accepted or 
used in practice, and so any mispricing there may have a greater impact on trading decisions.  
As market prices deviate from the models’ theoretical prices, a one unit increase in individual pricing errors 
is expected to increase market volume by 2.7% and 2.4%, respective to BS and BAW. When considering 
the combined model as a set, an increase in both pricing errors is expected to affect market volume by 5.1% 
and -2.4%. By constructing a 95% confidence interval of the estimates given mean pricing errors, we can 
expect that on average approximately 1.7-4.5% of market volume for SPY options traded between 
01/02/2015-12/30/2016 could potentially be in the form of systematic noise. 
Final Thoughts 
As the SPY is one of the deepest options markets in the world, with a highly diversified index and relatively 
smooth movements, extending this analysis to individual stocks or smaller portfolios may result in much 
higher rates of systematic noise. The presence of such noise does seem to refute some of the existing 
literature’s views on market efficiency, and shows that there exists at least a small but significant portion 
of market inefficiency that is driven by fundamental mispricings of theoretical models. Further research 
can be done to include other pricing models, and their respective estimated effects on trading volume could 
serve as an indicator to the relative usage of each model in practice. 
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